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Introduction
National and local ownership is critical to the successful implementation
of a peace process. In planning and executing a United Nations peacekeep-
ing operation’s core activities, every effort should be made to promote
national and local ownership and to foster trust and cooperation between
national actors. Effective approaches to national and local ownership not
only reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support man-
date implementation, they also help to ensure the sustainability of any
national capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn.1
The above quotation, from the 2008 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
Principles and Guidelines, known as the Capstone Doctrine, of the Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), reﬂects what has become a near ortho-
dox commitment to local ownership in United Nations (UN) peace operations
in post-conﬂict states. Similar rhetoric surrounding local ownership can be
found in any number of DPKO guidelines, best practices, and lessons learned
documents, as well as in the mandates of current peacekeeping operations
throughout the world, all of which endorse local ownership as a key principle
of peacekeeping.2 Advocates of local ownership of peacekeeping assert that it
renders peacekeeping more legitimate andmore sustainable by preserving host-
country consent; protecting UN impartiality; ensuring that reconstruction
1 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone
Doctrine) (New York, United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department
of Field Support, 2008), 39.
2 See, for example, United Nations, Capstone Doctrine; United Nations, A/63/881-S/2009/304
(2009), Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conﬂict; United
Nations, A/65/747-S/2011/85 (2011),Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conﬂict: Independent Report of
the Senior Advisory Group; and United Nations, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional
Peacekeeping Operations (New York: United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best
Practices Unit, 2003). With a few exceptions, UN mission mandates do not usually employ the term
local ownership, but reiterate that the primary responsibility for governance and security lies with the
government of the host country.
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efforts are rooted in indigenous structures, culture, and norms; and building
local capacity.
Because of these purported beneﬁts, local ownership has emerged as one of
the leading principles shaping peacekeeping operations today. In a 2011
meeting of the Security Council, local ownership was recognized “not only
as a moral imperative but also as a pragmatic necessity for legitimacy and
sustainability.”3 The 2009 UN Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in
the Immediate Aftermath of Conﬂict puts ownership at its heart, also calling it an
“imperative” in peacebuilding.4 The 2011 UN report Civilian Capacity in the
Aftermath of Conﬂict similarly makes national ownership the ﬁrst of its four
operational recommendations, noting that international interventions
should nurture existing national capacities as much as possible and support
national institutions “from within.”5
The culmination of this emphasis on ownership within the UN is, perhaps,
the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2005, which puts
local ownership at the center of its doctrine. To be on the agenda of the
Commission, a member state must request it, and a compact is then con-
cluded between the Commission and the state. Countries may also be referred
to the Commission by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the
Economic and Social Council, or the Secretary-General, but again, the state’s
consent is required. Moreover, the Commission is not an operational body,
but one that acts in an advisory capacity for the Security Council and the
General Assembly, meaning that leadership of program design, implementa-
tion, spending, and evaluation rest with the government of the concerned
state. The local ownership approach to peacebuilding is thus codiﬁed by the
PBC as one the UN must take, and Security Council Resolution 1645, which
established the Commission, afﬁrms “the primary responsibility of national
and transitional Governments and authorities of countries emerging from
conﬂict or at risk of relapsing into conﬂict . . . in identifying their priorities
and strategies for post-conﬂict peacebuilding, with a view to ensuring national
ownership.”6
Yet despite the widespread use of the term, local ownership remains remark-
ably understudied and, to date, understandings of ownership have been based
primarily on assumptions and normative beliefs held broadly in both the
policy and academic communities. These assumptions and beliefs appear to
be sound, justiﬁed, and even commonsensical, and it is difﬁcult to argue with
the perceived advantages of local ownership in peacekeeping. If international
3 United Nations, S/PV.6630 (2011), Proces-Verbaux of 6630th Meeting [provisional]: Maintenance
of International Peace and Security, 2.
4 United Nations, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 1. 5 United Nations, A/65/747-S/2011/85, 10.
6 United Nations, S/RES/1645 (2005).
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actors “do” everything for local actors—that is, ensure security, build institu-
tions, draft and uphold legislation, and encourage reconciliation—not only
will the peacekeeping process be perceived as externally imposed and hence
illegitimate, it is also likely to fail once the UN departs, as national actors will
have been unable to build the necessary capacity to continue what the UN has
begun. Accordingly, without local involvement, peacekeeping will both lose
legitimacy and be less sustainable over the long term.
However, despite these purported beneﬁts, the UN has failed to realize local
ownership in the broad way in which it is presented in discourse. Instead, the
UN often relegates local actors to a secondary role in peacekeeping, and aside
from a select group of elites, they tend to be excluded from decision-making
and implementation. This selective approach to ownership in turn prevents
the generation of legitimacy and sustainability that a more inclusive approach
to peacekeeping is thought to bring. In short, the UN both conceptualizes and
operationalizes local ownership in ways that undercut the very beneﬁts it
claims local ownership bestows.
Argument in Brief
Why does the UN advocate for local ownership based on a set of purported
beneﬁts while operationalizing it in a way that undermines the achievement
of those very beneﬁts? I argue that the primary reason for this is that peace-
keeping brings two key UN obligations into conﬂict, one normative—the
upholding of national self-determination—and one operational—the main-
tenance of international peace and security.
Much of the emphasis on local ownership in peacekeeping relates to a
deeper normative dedication to the principle of self-determination within
the UN. As an organization, the UN has long been a proponent of this
principle and of the corollary principle of non-interference in the domestic
affairs of member states. At the same time, the UN has an operational respon-
sibility to take action—including, at times, the deployment of armed peace-
keepers to war-torn states—when situations are deemed to constitute a threat
to international peace and security. However, international intervention, by
deﬁnition, violates the principles of self-determination and non-interference,
forcing the UN into a situation where it must either not act and violate one set
of institutional imperatives, or act and violate another. The emphasis on local
ownership, then, may be viewed as an attempt by the UN to reconcile these
conﬂicting imperatives. By giving local actors a leading role in peacekeeping,
the UN can minimize the degree of imposition entailed by its operations and
maintain the ability of local actors to determine their own political path, even
in the context of international intervention.
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However, as this book will show, because it is a contradictory and contested
concept and gives rise to its own set of operational challenges, local ownership
only enables the UN to paper over that difﬁculty. More speciﬁcally, while
discursively local ownership may seem like an appropriate solution to the
violation of institutional principles entailed by peace operations, in practice
the UN perceives the excessive devolution of responsibility for peacekeeping
to local actors to put at risk two key operational goals—the liberalization of the
post-conﬂict state and the delivery of demonstrable outputs in the short
term—goals that the UN links to its responsibility to maintain international
peace and security and that it is therefore under obligation to achieve. As a
result, the UN adjusts and limits local ownership both conceptually and in
practice, relying on it primarily as a discursive tool for legitimation but not an
operational principle for effective peacekeeping.
However, this restrictive approach to local ownership in practice brings the
UN’s actions into sharp contrast with its discourse, which depicts local own-
ership as entailing the broad and open inclusion of national actors in peace-
keeping and a relatively high degree of deference to their aspirations and
wishes. Because of this gap between the UN’s words and deeds, the UN’s
attempts to create legitimacy through discourse fail to persuade local actors,
suggesting that the UN’s discursive efforts appear to be more successful as a
tool of internal self-legitimation than one able to generate perceptions of
legitimacy among national actors. Moreover, because of variability in the
ways that the UN operationalizes local ownership, the UN not only deepens
the curtailment of self-determination and the degree of external imposition
on the host country, it also undercuts its ability to realize the very operational
goals it is trying to protect by constraining ownership, thus also limiting any
legitimacy it may derive from operational effectiveness.
Ultimately, while local ownershipmay be theoretically sound at ﬁrst glance,
it is not well understood and is actually a deeply contested concept, one that
does not lend itself to easy deﬁnition, one that can be translated into practice
in many different ways, and one that, at its broadest, is linked to the conﬂict-
ing operational and normative imperatives that face the UN. While it may be
able to reconcile the clash between intervention and self-determination “in
theory,” it does not enable the UN to actually eliminate this underlying
tension, and its operationalization of the concept is ultimately detrimental
to both its ability to adhere to the principles of self-determination and non-
imposition and to its operational effectiveness.
These arguments do not imply that local ownership has no positive value
whatsoever, that it cannot foster legitimacy and sustainability, preserve self-
determination, and mitigate external imposition. Nor does it imply that the
UN’s emphasis on local ownership is misguided or imprudent, that the UN is
“wrong” to include or exclude local actors under certain conditions, or that
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 19/9/2016, SPi
Whose Peace?
4
Comp. by: EElangovan Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0002800931 Date:19/9/16
Time:10:32:44 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002800931.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 5
local ownership should be jettisoned as a principle of UN peacekeeping oper-
ations. But because ownership is advocated so pervasively, it merits critical
examination in order to determine how the concept is understood, how it is
operationalized, how these understandings and practices do or do not lead to
expected effects, and what they reveal about the motivations of the UN in
peacekeeping.
Scope of the Book
The perception that local ownership may help to overcome the tension
between the UN’s normative and operational obligations in peacekeeping
and thus boost its legitimacy and sustainability has informed UN peacekeep-
ing policy to a large extent, but to date, the UN has proclaimed these positive
beneﬁts without describing the mechanisms that allegedly produce such
effects, specifying the conditions under which this correlation holds, or pro-
viding convincing empirical evidence that ownership does indeed boost legit-
imacy and sustainability by protecting self-determination and minimizing
external imposition. The claims that no peacekeeping effort will be sustain-
able if it is not directed by national actors or that peace and good governance
cannot be externally imposed are echoed by scholars, but they are grounded
neither in a careful theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship
between international and national actors in the post-conﬂict space and
their differing perspectives on peacekeeping and ownership, nor in an exam-
ination of how the UN translates the idea of local ownership into practice.
Indeed, because local ownership both as a concept and as a policy is thought
to be understood and considered to be logically sound, it is rarely questioned,
deconstructed, or analyzed, and is instead generally taken for granted by
international peacekeepers.
Worse, exactly what local ownership is remains unclear, despite its frequent
invocation in peacekeeping scholarship and policy discourse. According to
Simon Chesterman, local ownership refers “in a . . . vague way to the relation-
ship between stakeholders,” hazily suggesting the need to include national
actors in some way in international peacekeeping activities.7When, how, and
exactly who should be involved, remain underspeciﬁed, and the UN offers no
coherent deﬁnition of its own, despite its persistent emphasis on it.8 In
addition, neither the UN nor other analysts make reference to local
7 Simon Chesterman, “Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN
Statebuilding Operations,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1, no. 1 (March 2007): 4.
8 Béatrice Pouligny, “Local Ownership,” in Post-Conﬂict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, ed. Vincent
Chetail (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 175.
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understandings of local ownership, to whether these coincide with UN under-
standings, and to whether local actors feel a sense of ownership of the peace-
keeping process in their country, points that are critical to determining if local
ownership indeed functions as UN discourse suggests.
Additionally, though local ownership discourse has been present in peace-
keeping for more than a decade, few multidimensional peace operations have
conclusively “achieved” ownership, in the sense of having an implementa-
tion process that grants a signiﬁcant degree of agency to local actors, effects an
eventual full transfer of authority to them, or both. Many UN staff admit that
local ownership in peacekeeping complicates or even impedes the achieve-
ment of the UN’s operational objectives, most importantly the establishment
of liberal democratic political systems in the post-conﬂict country and the
more immediate delivery of demonstrable results, such as the disarmament of
combatants and collection of weapons, the undertaking of military patrols,
the holding of elections, the passing of legislation, and the running of public
sensitization campaigns.9 More importantly, despite the heavy emphasis on
local ownership in recent peacekeeping discourse, the same period has not
been marked by demonstrable changes in the legitimacy levels of UN mis-
sions, the long-term sustainability of their efforts, or the efﬁciency and rapid-
ity with which goals are achieved.10 In other words, it remains unclear how to
operationalize the principle of local ownership for peace operations in a way
that will both increase their sustainability and legitimacy and enable the UN
to realize its operational goals.
This “failure” of ownership is indicative of a disjuncture between policy
theory and actual practice: while local ownership may make sense in theory,
as described, it often fails to produce its intended practices and effects. “Good”
policies that are theoretically sound can still lead to “bad” outcomes because
of differences in understanding, contradictory goals and obligations, and
problems in implementation, which bridges beliefs, intentions, and effects.11
In the case of local ownership, for all the logical soundness of the concept in
9 The results-based budget (RBB) exercises that UN peace operations undertake provide a good
overview of the types of demonstrable outputs that missions seek to deliver. These tend to be
measured quantitatively, for example, the number of patrols undertaken, the number of meetings
held with various national and international interlocutors, the number of weapons collected, or
the number of police trained. For ﬁnancial performance reports that show progress on these
outputs, see, for example, United Nations, “ACABQ Reports: MONUC United Nations Mission in
the Democratic Republic of Congo,” <http://www.un.org/ga/acabq/documents/all/572?order=
title&sort=asc>.
10 Legitimacy in peacekeeping can, of course, derive from a variety of sources (as well as crumble
for a variety of reasons), but according to the discourse of local ownership, the degree to which
local actors are involved in peacekeeping should make a signiﬁcant and visible difference to
legitimacy levels.
11 See David Mosse, “Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reﬂections on the Ethnography of Aid
Policy and Practice,” Development and Change 35, no. 4 (2004): 640–1.
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terms of increasing legitimacy and sustainability, it fails to regularly produce
these results, suggesting that theories—or assumptions—of how local owner-
ship functions are incomplete. More speciﬁcally, local ownership may not
“work” as expected because of divergent understandings of what local owner-
ship is, because of how the UN “does” local ownership, because of conﬂicting
organizational imperatives, or because of differing perspectives on legitimacy.
This book, accordingly, strives to understand the gaps between theory,
practice, and effect by mapping the history of local ownership, the current
discourse of ownership, the various understandings of it on the part of both
UN and national actors, the various ways in which the UN operationalizes the
concept, and the divergent expectations of what it should deliver. My object-
ive is twofold: ﬁrst, to explore and unpack the concept and practices of local
ownership in peacekeeping, and second, to explain why local ownership has
failed to be effectively operationalized by the UN. These two objectives are
intertwined. In describing and categorizing understandings and practices of
local ownership, an explanation for the UN’s contradictory behavior emerges.
My analysis takes two approaches. First, I contextualize the issue of local
ownership through an analysis of the discourse of ownership. This includes an
examination of the origins of the concept in the ﬁeld of development and its
adoption into and evolution within peacekeeping, as well as the deﬁnitional
ambiguity surrounding the concept and the various potential local owners in
post-conﬂict situations.12 This analysis helps to uncover what the anticipated
beneﬁts of local ownership in peacekeeping are, and I explore in greater depth
how ownership is expected to boost legitimacy and sustainability by protect-
ing self-determination and minimizing external imposition.
Second, I examine the understandings of local ownership on the part of UN
and national actors as well as the different ways in which the UN operation-
alizes the concept. I do this both at the level of the UNmore broadly as well as
in the context of one primary case, the peacekeeping mission in Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), theMission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies
en Congo (MONUC), and a number of shadow cases, including the UN
missions in East Timor, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.13
This is done through analysis and interpretation of in-depth structured,
12 I examine UN documents on peacekeeping, the mandates of current and past missions, other
relevant Security Council resolutions, policy analyses, and academic writings.
13 MONUC ofﬁcially ended in June 2010, but the mission continues, essentially unchanged,
under the new name of the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies de Stabilisation en Congo
(MONUSCO). The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) ran from 1999 to 2002,
though it was succeeded by several follow-on missions; the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from
2003–present, though it was preceded by several earlier missions; the UN Assistance Mission to
Afghanistan (UNAMA), which is ofﬁcially a Special Political Mission managed by DPKO, from
2002–present; and the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) from 1995 to 2002. See
United Nations, “Peacekeeping Operations,” Department of Peacekeeping Operations, <http://
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/>.
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semi-structured, and unstructured interviews.14 This analysis enables me to
understand the UN’s understandings and operationalization of local owner-
ship in relation to the broader premises from which it deﬁnes its interests,
intentions, and values; to uncover areas of contestation and contradiction
within local ownership; and to clarify why the concept’s logical soundness
does not translate into stable or regular practices or effects.
Ultimately, this book shows that the contradictions that underlie local
ownership in peacekeeping are related to the broader institutional identity of
the UN. The UN is, on the one hand, a normative actor, one expected to adhere
to and promote the principles of self-determination and non-interference; on
the other, it is an operational actor, one that is expected to deliver concrete
results in peacekeeping and to contribute to the democratic transformation of
post-conﬂict states as a safeguard against future conﬂict. Because of the tension
between the goals dictated by these two sides of the organization’s identity,
local ownership is most appropriately viewed as a tool for legitimation used by
the UN, one that is expected to help it balance between the normative and
operational obligations that it faces as an organization.
Cases
While this study focuses on the UN’s peacekeeping practice as a whole, in
order to illustrate how the UN operationalizes local ownership and to capture
the national perspective on ownership, I use the UN peacekeeping mission in
DRC (MONUC) as a primary case study. MONUC was established in 1999 in
the context of the second civil war to ravage DRC.15 It was not only the largest
mission in UN history, with a total of over 22,000 uniformed personnel
(troops, military observers, and police) at its peak in 2007,16 but it also had
one of the broadest mandates, including provision of security and protection of
civilians; promotion of human rights; disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR) of combatants; disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
14 A total of eighty-seven semi-structured and unstructured interviews were conducted between
2009 and 2012 with UN staff; staff of Permanent Missions to the UN; Congolese political and
military ofﬁcials, civil society actors, and academics; and relevant academics, policy analysts, and
journalists. I also draw on my general knowledge of Congo and MONUC from the time that I lived
and worked there, 2006 to 2008.
15 I limit my analysis to the period from 2003, when the post-war Transitional Government was
established, until the mission’s end in 2010. The First Congo War (1996–7) resulted in the ousting
of long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko and his replacement by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The Second
Congo War (1998–2003) followed just a few months later, pitting externally backed rebel groups
against the regime in Kinshasa.
16 United Nations, “MONUC Facts and Figures,” Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monuc/facts.shtml>, and United Nations,
S/RES/1856 (2008).
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reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign combatants; security sector
reform (SSR); electoral assistance; and stabilization. It also included departments
speciﬁcally dedicated to HIV/AIDS education and awareness and gender equal-
ity, and it established the largest UN radio station in history, Radio Okapi.17
The war itself was highly complex, pitting externally backed rebel groups
against the regime in Kinshasa. It was characterized by multiple conﬂict
parties, shifting alliances, and both the fractioning of existing rebel factions
and the emergence of new ones during and after the war. At its height, the
conﬂict also became signiﬁcantly internationalized, drawing in seven neigh-
boring African countries.18 The conﬂict formally ended with the signing of the
Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in Sun City, South Africa, in December
2002, and its Final Act in April 2003, following a negotiation process known as
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which brought together the main Congolese
parties to the war as well as the political opposition (a coalition of unarmed
groups and parties) and civil society (known as the forces vives), including
traditional leaders. The agreement established a transitional government
known as the 1+4 model, which included one president, Joseph Kabila, and
four vice-presidents, one each from two main rebel groups—the Rassemble-
ment Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (RCD-G) and theMouvement pour
la Libération du Congo (MLC)—Kabila’s former government, and the political
opposition. Two other agreements—the Pretoria Agreement between Congo
and Rwanda and the Luanda Agreement between Congo and Uganda—were
signed in July 2002 and September 2002 respectively.19
Peacekeeping following these internecine conﬂicts came with a number of
challenges. The rapidly changing constellation of conﬂict parties and stake-
holders has meant that even a question as simple as determining who poten-
tial local owners are is complicated. In addition, some parts of the country,
notably the northeastern district of Ituri and the eastern provinces of North
and South Kivu, continued and continue to see intermittent ﬁghting well after
the formal cessation of hostilities, both related and unrelated to the “main”
divisions of the war. These challenges have been exacerbated by the presence
of large deposits of natural resources, including oil and timber, and copper,
coltan, cassiterite, gold, diamonds, and other minerals, which evoke the
interest of neighboring countries and multinational mining companies as
well as enable state and non-state actors to sustain their activities. On a
17 See United Nations, S/RES/1493 (2003); S/RES/1565 (2004); S/RES/1596 (2005); S/RES/1756
(2007); S/RES/1794 (2007); S/RES/1797 (2008); S/RES/1856 (2008); S/RES/1906 (2009); and
“MONUC Mandate,” Department of Peacekeeping Operations. <http://www.un.org/en/peace
keeping/missions/past/monuc/mandate.shtml>.
18 These are Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Chad, Burundi, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.
19 Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International
Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 51–3.
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practical note, the sheer geographic size of the Congo (approximately the size
of Western Europe), together with its weak to non-existent infrastructure,
made the logistics of the operation complex and expensive.20 Finally, the
size of the mission itself meant that coordination and communication
between departments, between civilian and military staff, and with headquar-
ters in New York were challenging.
While the case of MONUC is an extremely complex one, it is also one that is
central to understanding the UN’s conceptualization and operationalization
of ownership and therefore one from which conclusions can be expected to
apply more broadly. Because it was the largest peacekeeping operation in UN
history and garnered widespread international attention, MONUC has had a
strong inﬂuence on the UN’s peacekeeping practice generally and has been
vital to deﬁning and redeﬁning the principles according to which peacekeep-
ing is pursued, both within and outside of the UN. Indeed, MONUC was
established around the same time that local ownership began to seep into
peacekeeping discourse and it embraced the rhetoric of national ownership
and inclusive approaches. It is thus a case from which the assumptions under-
pinning UN understandings of ownership and the resulting practices can be
gleaned. In addition, because peace operations now constitute one of the UN’s
most important activities, with the DPKO budget nearly double the regular
budget, critical examination of the assumptions and practices that inform
peacekeeping policy is a necessary and important endeavor.21
While Congo provides a highly pertinent case for examining the meanings
and uses of ownership, this study is not exclusively about Congo. Indeed, local
ownership is a crosscutting or “meta” issue that is treated as a general principle
of peacekeeping by UN staff, not as one relevant to certain missions and not
others. UN staff therefore do not usually view its importance or operationalize
it differently in different operations, but instead transfer conceptions of it
from one context to another.
For this reason, the study is also enriched with examples from a number of
other cases, including East Timor, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Bosnia.22 While
these cases incorporatemany of the challenges seen in Congo, such as shifting
alliances and fragmenting conﬂict parties, the presence of natural resources,
20 Congo has only 2,794 kilometers of paved roads and less than 1 ﬁxed line telephone per 100
people. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The World Factbook: Congo, Democratic Republic
of,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html>. The UN therefore
relied on air transportation for the movement of personnel and goods in the country. Air operations
regularly accounted for over 50% of the mission’s operational budget and over 20% of its overall
budget. See United Nations, “ACABQ Reports.”
21 The UN’s regular budget for the biennium 2016–17 is $5.4 billion, and its peacekeeping
budget for the 2015–16 ﬁscal year is approximately $8.27 billion. See United Nations, A/RES/70/
249 A-C (2016); and United Nations, A/C.5.69.24.
22 Though the armed interventions in Bosnia and Afghanistan were not led by the UN, it was
extensively involved in civilian peacekeeping.
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the interference of neighboring states, and complex mission structures, they
were selected primarily because they represent different models of peacekeep-
ing that vary on the degree of authority that local actors can and should have.
The UNmissions in Bosnia and East Timor were highly intrusive international
transitional administrations, in which the international community effect-
ively took over sovereignty from the host state and became intricately
involved in nearly all aspects of post-conﬂict governance and reconstruction
on a temporary basis. By contrast, the international community adopted a
“light footprint” approach in Afghanistan that put local actors in the lead on
peacekeeping. Liberia, for its part, is often held up as a success for local
ownership, where a number of institutions were handed over to Liberians
and remain effectively managed by them. These examples thus represent a
variety of “takes” on local ownership, and are thus able to conﬁrm and add
subtlety to ﬁndings in the primary case of Congo.
Why Read this Book
This book’s primary contribution is to the ongoing discussion surrounding
local ownership in peacekeeping, one that often takes for granted the beneﬁts
of local ownership and treats it as accepted wisdom. It contrasts ownership in
theory with ownership in practice, unpacking the discourse, understandings,
and operationalization of the concept and providing detailed empirical data to
demonstrate how ownership works—or does not work—in peacekeeping. This
analysis is relevant both to peacekeeping scholars and policymakers, for
whom local ownership has become a key principle and a widely accepted,
yet understudied, concept.
More broadly, this book contributes to debates about different approaches
to rebuilding war-torn states, the effectiveness of UN interventions, and the
conﬂicting obligations of the UN. As mentioned, local ownership gets to the
heart of the question of the appropriate roles for national and international
actors in post-conﬂict settings. By taking into account the dynamic relation-
ship between actors and the contradictory interests and obligations they face,
this book adds nuance to debates over how more or less international intru-
sion affects the effectiveness and legitimacy of peacekeeping.
Beyond the debate over peacekeeping paradigms, there exists a broader
debate about whether international intervention can ever be effective. As
described, there is a good deal of normative discomfort with the imposition
of external structures and norms on national polities, as well as a strong
resistance to it by national actors, because it is perceived to violate the right
to self-determination. At the same time, many studies conclude that inter-
national interventions can go a long way toward helping war-torn states on
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the road to stability and development, and few are willing to leave them to
their own devices. By addressing the relationship between local and inter-
national actors in peacekeeping and between the operational and normative
obligations of peacekeepers, this study adds a new dimension to a larger
debate in international relations about the effect, if any, of external interven-
tions on internal processes, a discussion that extends “upwards” to develop-
ment assistance, democratization, and globalization, and “downwards” to
issue-speciﬁc areas such as transitional justice and security sector reform.
Finally, this book frames its analysis within a broader discussion of the
conﬂicting normative and operational objectives of the UN, thus shedding
light on the motivations of the UN as an actor and the ways in which it seeks
to generate legitimacy and reafﬁrm its identity (or identities). Ultimately, by
increasing our understanding of the various goals of the UN’s peace operations
and the different obligations behind actual practices, this book speaks to
students of international organizations, helping to increase our understanding
of how international organizations function and prioritize their various goals.
Overview of the Book
My argument is developed through a further eight chapters. Chapter 2 estab-
lishes a framework for understanding local ownership, focusing on the con-
ﬂict between the UN’s normative and operational obligations in peacekeeping
and drawing on theories of the behavior of international organizations.
Speciﬁcally, I examine the principle of self-determination, assessing current
understandings of the concept and how a duty to uphold the self-
determination of member states constrains the UN’s approach to interven-
tion, while also taking into account the operational imperative of the UN to
act in conﬂict situations. My analysis of the UN’s various institutional impera-
tives and the contradiction between them enables me to demonstrate how
current thinking about and the apparent logic behind local ownership in
peacekeeping fails to hold in practice.
Chapter 3 traces the evolution of the concept of local ownership from its
origins in development to its introduction into peacekeeping. This discursive
history examines the various usages of the term—What is being owned? Who
are the owners?When should ownership begin? This discussion brings to light
two important assumptions on the part of the UN: ﬁrst, that local ownership
enhances legitimacy and sustainability by preserving the host country’s self-
determination and minimizing the degree of UN imposition on it, and sec-
ond, that ownership is something technical and implementable, and not
something normatively laden and contested. This view, however, neglects
the normative bases for understandings of ownership, thus failing to grasp
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the fact that national and international actors understand ownership very
differently and therefore have different expectations of their respective roles
in peacekeeping.
Chapter 4 focuses on this latter point, examining how in fact divergent
normative beliefs inform understandings of ownership. Speciﬁcally, it shows
how different conceptualizations of peacekeeping—namely liberal and com-
munitarian peacekeeping—give rise to these different understandings on the
part of UN and national actors: for the UN, local ownership is a limited
concept that entails a process of appropriation by national actors of a liberal
vision of post-conﬂict political order; for national actors, ownership is a broad
concept in which national actors imagine, deﬁne, and realize their own vision
for post-conﬂict peace and peacekeeping, with material and technical assist-
ance from international actors.
This discussion brings two important contradictions to light. First, while the
UN’s discourse reveals a belief that local ownership will boost the legitimacy
and sustainability of peacekeeping by rendering it more indigenous, its under-
standing reveals a conviction that indigenous practices are necessarily illiberal
and contributed to the outbreak of ﬁghting in the ﬁrst place, and therefore
must be replaced or altered. Second, it shows that while the UN’s discourse of
local ownership displays a belief that ownership will also render peacekeeping
more legitimate by promoting self-determination, its understanding of local
ownership actually restricts self-determination and deepens external intru-
sion into the host country by limiting it within liberal parameters. Most
importantly, this discussion shows how the UN shapes and constrains the
version of local ownership present in its discourse in order to preserve
the achievement of a key operational goal—in this case the liberalization of
the post-conﬂict state.
Chapters 5 and 6 turn to the issue of how the UN operationalizes owner-
ship. Chapter 5 focuses on practices of ownership, that is, the concrete activ-
ities that the UN undertakes to create andmaintain ownership. I show that the
UN implements ownership in a half-hearted and ad hoc manner, employing a
range of practices that are neither coordinated nor explicitly or exclusively
geared toward the creation of local ownership. Most importantly, I show how
the UN undertakes these practices in a restrictive way that limits the amount
of substantive agency turned over to local actors, out of a fear that doing so
will imperil the achievement of its operational goals. Accordingly, in line with
understandings, the UN constrains the practices of local ownership in order to
promote its operational objectives; in so doing, it further weakens self-
determination and thus legitimacy and sustainability.
Chapter 6 addresses a different aspect of operationalization, focusing on the
UN’s selection of local owners. It outlines two distinct approaches to the
selection of local owners: ﬁrst, in what I call liberal ownership, the UN interacts
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with and includes a broad variety of groups in its activities, regardless of their
capacity levels, with the condition that they be moderate and liberal; second,
in what I call elite ownership, actors are selected for their existing level of
capacity to undertake and maintain peacekeeping and governance activities,
regardless of their liberal credentials. These both represent highly selective
approaches to ownership, again demonstrating how the UN constrains the
broad and inclusive ownership depicted in discourse in order to protect its
ability to achieve its operational goals. However, this selective operationaliza-
tion of local ownership also negatively affects self-determination and deepens
the level of UN imposition onto the host country, thus imperiling legitimacy
and sustainability further.
Chapter 7 brings together the previous three chapters to address why the
UN, despite the fact that it has a restricted conceptualization of ownership and
constrains it operationally, continues to invoke the discourse of local owner-
ship. I examine how the UN aims to generate legitimacy through discourse
both for local actors and for itself by depicting the intrusive activities of
peacekeeping as locally owned. I show, however, that because of the gap
between its rhetoric and its behavior and between the UN’s and local actors’
understandings of what local ownership should entail, these efforts are
unconvincing in the eyes of local actors. At the same time, despite its failure
to boost legitimacy in the eyes of local actors, local ownership discourse is
employed as a tool for self-legitimation for the UN, enabling it to justify its
actions internally and reassure itself of its continued legitimacy. However,
both of these legitimation efforts, whether successful or not, seek only legit-
imacy through adherence to institutional principles, with little regard to other
sources of legitimacy, including, most importantly, operational effectiveness.
Chapter 8 turns to this latter point, examining how the UN’s restrictive, ad
hoc, and selective approach to local ownership, conceptually and operation-
ally together with the broad discourse it invokes, affect its ability to achieve its
two overarching operational goals—the liberalization of the host country and
the delivery of tangible outputs—despite the fact that that it is precisely the
concern for these goals that leads the UN to limit local ownership. The chapter
explores several reasons for this. On the one hand, because liberal ownership
emphasizes the interactionwith liberal but weak actors with little capacity and
little inﬂuence, it weakens its own ability to deliver results quickly and efﬁ-
ciently while also minimizing its impact on the nature of the structures and
institutions of the state. On the other hand, because elite ownership entails
the interaction with more capable actors but ones that often have illiberal
tendencies, the UN often entrenches their power and loses leverage over them
and thus undercuts its ability to achieve results in the near term and to orient
them in more democratic directions. This effect is aggravated by the UN’s
discursive emphasis on local ownership, which enables local actors,
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 19/9/2016, SPi
Whose Peace?
14
Comp. by: EElangovan Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0002800931 Date:19/9/16
Time:10:32:49 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002800931.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 15
particularly elites, to justify their resistance to the UN, in effect turning the
UN’s own discourse against it. Ultimately, the UN’s failure to achieve its stated
goals also imperils its legitimacy, as it prevents the UN from demonstrating
operational effectiveness.
Chapter 9 offers concluding remarks on my ﬁndings, while also situating
the book within broader debates in peacekeeping and international relations.
A Note on Terminology
Several terms employed throughout this study require clear deﬁnition. First,
this book addresses multidimensional peacekeeping operations, which some
analysts refer to as peacebuilding. Within the UN, however, peacebuilding
refers to the work of the PBC, so I use the term peacekeeping, except where
I reference the work of others who use the term peacebuilding. I also use the
term peacekeeping and peacekeepers to refer to both military and civilian
activities and personnel.
Second, for expediency, I use the term United Nations (UN) to refer to the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and its ﬁeld missions. The
UN is, of course, a large and diverse organization, and its many different
departments, funds, and agencies represent a plethora of viewpoints and
opinions on the matters discussed in this study. Indeed, as can be seen from
the diversity of interviewees targeted by this study (see Annex I), it was my
speciﬁc intention to capture this diversity of perspective. However, as the
headquarters and ﬁeld staff of DPKO are the primary UN actors with which
I am concerned, when I use the term UN, I refer to them unless I specify
otherwise.
Finally, I use the term local ownership interchangeably with national own-
ership. Local ownership is the phrase most commonly found in UN peace-
keeping discourse as well as academic and policy writings on the subject, and
it is therefore the phrase used most often in this book. However, by local I do
not mean subnational, I simply mean the opposite of international, unless
speciﬁcally noted. For this reason, I also refer to local and national actors
interchangeably, unless otherwise speciﬁed.
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